2019: Only 1.3% GDP growth, snap elections a distinct possibility

The month of June was marked by various political irritations which of course also had a certain impact on economies and markets. The US-EU trade conflicts seems set to broaden beyond steel and aluminium. The threat of imposing tariffs on US car imports will be felt particularly in the export-driven German car industry which already has to deal with stricter regulations and a cyclical slowdown in important export markets. On the domestic front, the German retail sector is facing ongoing structural change due to digitalisation. The German government crisis between the CDU and the Bavarian CSU over the course of the asylum policy is still not settled despite the rather constructive outcome of the EU summit. The various party bodies will convene and later on Monday there will be another meeting between Chancellor Merkel and Interior Minister Seehofer. In view of the factors weighing on economic sentiment, we consider our recent adjustment of our annual GDP growth forecast from 2.3% to 2% to be justified. [more]

Weaker recent data – too early to throw in the towel, but 2018 GDP forecast cut to 2%. Although German Q1 GDP growth now looks like reaching around ¼% qoq, we still expect some positive payback in Q2, as some temporary factors depressing activity should disappear. Corporate investment spending will be key for growth in the remainder of the year. Unfortunately, signals from proxy indicators have become somewhat mixed recently too. Notwithstanding a likely, albeit limited, Q2 rebound in activity, the strong drop in the expectations' component of the ifo business climate suggests that we have probably passed the peak in qoq growth rates in the current cycle. Due to the weaker Q1 we have lowered our GDP forecast for 2018 from 2.3% to 2.0%. (Also included in this issue: industrial producer and import prices, labour migration, fiscal policy) [more]

The EU institutions are about to decide on major new rules regarding the reception and the treatment of asylum applicants as well as their allocation among member states. The trigger for the intended reforms relate to the current regulatory framework’s shortcomings that emerged during the refugee crisis: an uneven sharing of responsibilities for asylum procedures and massive irregular migration within the EU. However, the Dublin procedure recast has stalled, as several member states strictly refuse the planned corrective mechanism for a fair sharing of responsibility. The prospects seem to be more favourable with regard to the harmonisation of the asylum procedures and conditions. [more]

From the start, the negotiations were ill-fated. To begin with, the SPD leadership rejected a revival of the grand coalition (Groko). Then, the partly diametrically opposed interests of the parties involved, seemingly abundant financial scope and a lack of interest in fundamental reforms on the part of the German population led to a – in many areas – mixed bag of measures which, on balance, aims to further increase governmental control of the business sector and society at the expense of individual freedom. However, at present, the predominant feeling is relief that Germany now has a “decent“ government. But not only the coalition partners may soon wonder whether the price is too high. [more]

The four-month deadlock following the inconclusive German federal elections was brought closer to its end with the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The last hurdle to Merkel's re-election is now the SPD membership ballot which is expected to give its approval, though at a thin margin. The agreement foresees significant investment in infrastructure and education but caters too much to permanent spending on social and pension policy given the largely cyclical nature of the budgetary leeway. Europe is supposed to take centre stage in the would-be coalition's policy – a signal which matters for Martin Schulz but less so for the member ballot and the German voter. The coalition commits itself to the transformation of the ESM and more spending on Europe but the red lines will only emerge when the details will be tabled. Surprisingly, the SPD will hold most of the major portfolios in the cabinet. With the foreign and the finance ministry the SPD got hold on the key portfolios for shaping the European policy course, although the key decisions will still be left to the chancellor. [more]

The economy continues to steam ahead, with quarterly GDP growth of 0.5% qoq in the winter half. A tight labour market and swelling order books are boosting the union's bargaining power so they are pushing hard for higher wages, although increases might fall short of expectations among workers and the ECB tower. Meanwhile in Berlin, Groko hopefuls are spending Germany's fiscal surpluses, seemingly unconcerned with demographic challenges and the fact that record low interest rates and above potential growth will not last. This party will likely go on for some time - maybe even a few years. However, the situation feels increasingly reminiscent of carnival revellers' popular song "Am Aschermittwoch ist alles vorbei" (It's all over on Ash Wednesday). [more]

With a growth rate of probably 2.3% in 2017, Germany delivered the main positive surprise in the industrial world. In 2018, German GDP looks set to expand by 2.3% again. If this forecast materialises, Germany will grow at an above-potential rate for the fifth year in a row. The upcoming wage round and resilient demand combined with the global decline in free capacities might, however, push up prices more strongly than currently expected. We already voiced concerns ahead of the Bundestag elections that the new government (just like its predecessor) might not pay sufficient attention to urgent challenges such as digitalisation, demographics and globalisation as the labour market situation is favourable. Now that forming a government has turned out to be unexpectedly difficult our concerns have increased. [more]

Employment in Germany has been rising for years now. However, cyclical tailwinds increasingly hide structural problems, such as tighter regulation and demographic developments. If the labour market is not to become a major obstacle to German growth, the future government will need to take quick and decisive action to counteract existing and imminent imbalances on this key market. Reducing long-term unemployment will require a mix of policy measures. The total number of jobs would probably be significantly lower, if there was no low-wage sector. Integrating refugees and the “mismatch” between the qualifications desired by employers and the qualifications which unemployed people actually possess are major challenges. Which direction is the new German government going to take in labour market policy? [more]

Envisaged Jamaica coalition: After the exploratory talks is before the negotiations. It would not come as a surprise, if the coalition formation were to take longer than ever before in the Federal Republic and if the chancellor were not until January. Given that in many areas critical details remained unresolved in the first round of the exploratory talks, further challenging rounds will follow in the next few weeks. Only after that will the official coalition talks begin - provided the Greens sound the all-clear at their party convention. The search for compromises is aggravated, as many of the partners’ requests have to remain unfulfilled despite buoyant tax revenues. Initially, i.e. in 2018, the economic impulse of a "black-yellow-green" fiscal policy is likely to be very limited. But steps in the right direction of strengthening Germany are on the horizon. Another positive is the clear commitment to a united and strong Europe. (Also included in this issue: November tax estimate, German current account surplus, trends in the EU industry) [more]

The view from Berlin: Jamaica unlikely to trigger fundamental policy changes. The total additional fiscal impulse provided by a Jamaica coalition could in our view amount to between EUR 15 bn and EUR 20 bn in 2018. This would be only marginally more than the EUR 15 bn tax cuts "promised" by the outgoing Minister of Finance, which we had already taken into account in our 1.8% GDP forecast for 2018. Proposals in the FDP's election platform to scale back the ESM and to install an orderly EMU exit procedure have raised concerns among some EU politicians. We doubt that these two proposals will make it into the coalition treaty. Despite the FDP's insistence on more market- and rule-based procedure within EMU, it is very unlikely that Germany would not provide the necessary support if another EMU country slipped into acute crisis. (Also included in this issue: Public finances after the election, World trade) [more]

Germany booming but wage-inflation still missing. We have lifted our 2017 GDP forecast from 1.6% to 1.9%. 2018 we revised only marginally up (from 1.7% to 1.8%) as we expect euro-induced export headwinds to counteract domestic strength. In H1 the economy expanded with an annualized rate of 2.6%. With EUR appreciation feeding through only gradually and capex picking up, GDP growth should slow only marginally in H2. 2018 kicks off with wage negotiation in key sectors. The strong labour market suggests wage settlements north of 3%, but the (classic) Phillips curve nexus is only weak and other factors could weigh. (Also included in this issue: German wage round in 2018, industry output forecast, The view from Berlin) [more]