Extraordinary semiconductor cycle triggered by one-time events, cyclical and geopolitical effects

With our new German Economic Chartbook, we take the pulse of the German economy, both from a cyclical and a structural perspective. What better time for its launch than the upward revision to our 2023 forecast. We now expect only a mild technical recession in the winter half-year, so annual GDP should move sideways rather than contract. The abating energy price shock has also prompted a downward revision to our inflation forecast, although we remain concerned about wage dynamics and their impact on core inflation, given the increasingly structural tightness in the labour market. Still, the resulting loss of real purchasing power will prevent private consumption from boosting growth as its did in 2022, when the normalisation of the savings rate more than offset the decline in real disposable income. [more]

We look at the expected recession in the winter half-year 2022/23 and the onset of recovery, how inflation will peak, while the labor market loses momentum and private consumption is hit by the loss of purchasing power. Construction and Capex spending are set to deteriorate. Fiscal policy continues to lean against the headwinds but should normalize somewhat. Loan growth, both with corporates and private households, may slow substantially. In a medium-term perspective, we discuss risks for the manufacturing industry and Germany’s geopolitical and competitive position. [more]

No industrial sector in Germany has been affected as severely by the gas shortage and higher gas prices as the chemical industry. The industry's production level in October 2022 was 22.5% lower than in the 4th quarter of 2021. The prospects for the chemical industry in Germany have also deteriorated in the medium term. [more]

Semiconductors rank first as the most traded goods in global trade statistics in 2020, representing 15% of total global trade in goods. Before 2015, they were surpassed by computers and crude oil, based on the HS4 categorization by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Prices for semiconductors have fallen dramatically and steadily since 1995, both in real and nominal terms. Our new Trade Chain Complexity Index (TCC Index) allows for a comparison of the ratio of global trade with sales of various goods. For semiconductors, the TCC Index shows a peak of 7.2 for 2008. Since then, the complexity value has steadily decreased with a value of 5.9 for 2020. This trend might be the first sign of more cautious supply chain strategies in a challenging macro environment - and a downward trend for semiconductor globalization in a new era of digital sovereignty. [more]

GDP: Lower risk of gas shortages but real income shock will bite. Fully replenished gas storages and the larger than expected fiscal support for households suggest that the recession will not be as deep as expected a few weeks ago, although private households will have to cope with a real income shock. [more]

Global sales of semiconductors reached an all-time high in 2021. At the same time, global tensions and growing awareness of the fragility of supply chains have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of global supply chains and semiconductors. We use our Structural Semiconductor Sales Model (3SM) to explore the extent to which government initiatives on digital sovereignty in the US, Europe, and Asia will impact chip manufacturing capacities. In doing so, we calculate structural (i.e., non-cyclical) supply and demand for the period up to 2030. Assuming a continuation of historical supply and demand trends and a further tightening of the ratio of sales to investments (sales-to-capex ratio), it is our forecast that a huge structural demand gap will emerge in 2030 that cannot be closed by the government subsidy programs announced to date. From this perspective, today’s temporary supply chain issues may overlap with or be succeeded by structural shortages. [more]

Digital policy has become increasingly important in recent years. With its digital strategy, the German government has presented an agenda for which a digital budget is to be adopted in the Bundestag in November 2022. This is an important contribution by Germany to the EU's Digital Decade, particularly in the four areas of connectivity (5G and fiber coverage), digital skills, the use of digital technologies and AI in companies, and the provision of digital public services. Further legislative initiatives at EU level have as their goal the creation of a digital space in order to be able to compete internationally with Asia and the USA. To this end, the German government's digital strategy sets priorities in 25 fields of action. The next three years will be decisive for an effective implementation of the digital reform program for Germany. [more]

German economy: Out in the cold. The real income and confidence shock resulting from the NS1 shutoff as well as the negative real wealth shock of some EUR 1.5 tn will likely send private consumption into a tailspin in 2023. Surging uncertainty and the energy shock causing a slump in competitiveness and profits will put a brake on corporate investment spending, in our opinion. The three fiscal packages and a probable additional one will likely not prevent a GDP slump. Together with a weaker global outlook, we expect the loss in final domestic demand to result in a GDP drop of 3% to 4% in 2023, after an increase of around 1% in 2022. [more]

On July 21, the ECB announced that it would raise the interest rate on the deposit facility from -0.5% to 0%, effective July 27. By the end of that very month, banks in Germany had reduced their stock of banknotes and coins by a record EUR 11 billion. There is much to suggest that they will continue to reduce their non-interest-bearing cash holdings, as the ECB interest rate will rise further to 0.75% in mid-September. [more]

The German labour market held up well during the pandemic and even gained momentum from 2021 onwards. In the meantime, a shift in the employment structure took place that brings the shortage of skilled labour back into focus. [more]

Germany's current account is in flux. Currently, the "terms of trade" shock is reducing the surplus in the goods balance. But structural factors such as the reduced importance of industry and demographics also point to lower surpluses. In addition, we expect a further narrowing of the deficits in the services balance. The surpluses from the primary and secondary balance, on the other hand, are likely to increase further. In total, the current account ratio will fall sharply in 2022, especially measured in terms of GDP, and will also tend to be significantly lower than in the past thereafter. Accordingly, criticism of Germany's surpluses is likely to become increasingly muted. [more]

Moving into recession. A likely further decline in Russian gas supply after the maintenance of NS1 will necessitate additional savings. While we do not expect a full rationing, we believe the economic consequences will together with a US recession and other headwinds push Germany into a recession in H2 2022. Given that prospects for Russian gas deliveries have darkened since February, this energy shock will not hit Germany by surprise or unprepared. Hence, we expect a modest but rather drawn-out GDP decline, as the economy gradually adjusts. After a 1 ¼% expansion in 2022, German GDP will shrink by around 1% in 2023, largely because consumers will not be able to offset the real income loss by further dissaving. In a “tap remains turned off” scenario, we expect a rationing of gas leading to a GDP slump between 5% and 6% in 2023. [more]