Housing market could create a catch-22 for the ECB

We showed in March that, in Germany, house prices have kept up with inflation during periods with high inflation and that, over decades, house prices have increased even faster than consumer prices. Here, we extend the analysis to other countries. [more]

The boom is over. Five key arguments lead us to expect only a price dip. Negative real interest rates, inflation protection through real estate, rising rental growth and most importantly a high fundamental supply shortage. In addition, real house prices have already fallen very sharply due to the surge in inflation. CO2 emissions from buildings are increasingly coming into focus. Prices have started to diverge between properties with low and high emissions. This divergence is likely to increase. [more]

The German economy – one year after. With surprisingly strong hard data for January, chances are rising that GDP might be saved from another decline in Q1. Although not yet our baseline call, this would prevent Germany from going through a technical recession. However, still heightened uncertainty and real income losses due to high inflation will likely keep investment spending and private consumption flatlining in the first half of the year. Hence, we maintain our 0% forecast for 2023 German GDP growth, although upside risks have increased since the start of the year. [more]

We calculate a nominal and real return triangle for German house prices from 1970 to 2022. The market offered an inflation hedge in the past. This is in particular true for periods of high inflation as in these periods house prices even exceeded inflation. The huge supply shortage and rising rents are further arguments for a bottoming out of house prices in 2023. [more]

House prices are cooling off around the world after the boom years of historically low interest rates and a pandemic race for space. Countries like Sweden, Canada and Australia, which had the biggest gains, heaviest household debt and highest proportion of variable rate mortgages, are most exposed. In the latest episode of Podzept, Michael Hsueh, FX Strategist and author of the G10 Housing Monitor, Jon Bell, Head of the European Construction and House Building Research, and Adrian Cox, Thematic Strategist, discuss the outlook. [more]

We look at the expected recession in the winter half-year 2022/23 and the onset of recovery, how inflation will peak, while the labor market loses momentum and private consumption is hit by the loss of purchasing power. Construction and Capex spending are set to deteriorate. Fiscal policy continues to lean against the headwinds but should normalize somewhat. Loan growth, both with corporates and private households, may slow substantially. In a medium-term perspective, we discuss risks for the manufacturing industry and Germany’s geopolitical and competitive position. [more]

Rising mortgage rates and shortages of building materials led to a shock of uncertainty in the housing market over the last months. But there are many countervailing effects. Hence, it is not set in stone that the house price cycle comes to an end. [more]

In the last months the strong headwinds for the construction industry are expected to ease as commodity prices fall and material and labor shortages begin to decline. [more]

We expect the German residential property market cycle to come to an end during the current decade. A combination of our different approaches suggests that, despite the uncertainties, the cycle will probably end in 2024. Prices will not necessarily undergo a massive correction from their peak, our baseline scenario foresees an isolated ending of the cycle. As migration inflows were low and new construction activity has been dynamic during the pandemic, fundamental supply shortages are a thing of the past for many German cities. The current refugee wave will only temporarily weigh on the market. [more]

War in Ukraine – slowing but not ending the German recovery. In a moderate economic scenario (which is our new baseline forecast) we expect German GDP to grow by between 2 ½% and 3% (old forecast 4%). Surging energy prices should push the annual inflation rate to around 5 ½% in 2022. Government spending is expected to be ramped up by 1 ¼ and 1 ½ pp, limiting the overall growth loss. In a more severe scenario headline inflation could rise to between 6 ½% and 7%, as oil and gas deliveries are at least temporarily halted. Annual GDP growth should be a meagre 1% to 1 ½%. [more]

4% GDP growth in 2022, despite technical recession in winter half. A synchronous acceleration should result in annual GDP growth of 4%. In 2023, quarterly GDP growth will slow towards trend. In fiscal policy ambitious spending plans and debt brake commitment lead to open funding questions. Based on the previous fiscal regime, the fiscal deficit is set to narrow considerably. Still, the new government’s big spending plans, which are not yet quantifiable, could drive deficits considerably higher. Inflation decelerating from 5%+ rates, but higher core rate more permanent. Carryover effects and cost pressures will keep CPI inflation elevated. In 2023, headline and core rates are unlikely to fall below 2%. German politics 2022: “Team Scholz” will focus on climate protection and sizeable corporate tax allowances for green and digital investments. German EU policy might be less fiscal orthodox and open to a cautious reform of the EU’s fiscal rules. [more]

In terms of housing policy concepts in Germany, there are only minor overlaps between the plans of left-wing and right-wing parties. The CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the AfD continue to support supply-oriented housing policies. The SPD, the Greens, and the Left prefer demand-oriented approaches. The CDU and the FDP promise to reduce price and rent pressure by providing additional supply and to offer incentives for renovation and retrofitting. People who are living in a rented home and do not want to move will probably find the plans of the SPD, the Left or the Greens attractive. Private households might see the ancillary costs of buying a home decline after the elections, as opposed to large-scale investors. Overall, none of the parties has prepared a comprehensive concept. And none of them has paid attention to what their demands may mean in terms of necessary labour, funds, space, etc. [more]