Moving into recession

The costs of electricity generation of different energy sources are often debated. Often, however, no distinction is made as to which specific costs are meant. While renewable energies have marginal costs close to zero and very competitive levelized costs of electricity, a high and increasing share of weather-dependent renewables leads to system costs. They result, for example, from the provision of back-up power plants and the falling average capacity utilization of all existing power plants. We discuss the different types of costs of power generation and note that investments in renewables are easier to realize than the construction of new back-up power plants. [more]

In the first edition of our Energy Transition Monitor, we take stock of the current speed of renewables rollout, e-car uptake, heat-pump installations, and energy infrastructure build-up (e.g., regarding hydrogen) in Germany. We then analyse existing bottlenecks for reaching envisaged targets for 2030. Finally, we provide an update of current policy action aimed at mitigating those bottlenecks, both at the EU and national level, and potential implications of these policy measures on investment spending (private and public). [more]

The German economy – one year after. With surprisingly strong hard data for January, chances are rising that GDP might be saved from another decline in Q1. Although not yet our baseline call, this would prevent Germany from going through a technical recession. However, still heightened uncertainty and real income losses due to high inflation will likely keep investment spending and private consumption flatlining in the first half of the year. Hence, we maintain our 0% forecast for 2023 German GDP growth, although upside risks have increased since the start of the year. [more]

Despite the lower absolute energy imports, Germany had to pay significantly more for its imports because of higher prices. Total primary energy demand in Germany fell by just under 5% in 2022. Oil, coal, and renewables have expanded their share in primary energy demand, while natural gas and nuclear energy have lost importance. [more]

We look at the expected recession in the winter half-year 2022/23 and the onset of recovery, how inflation will peak, while the labor market loses momentum and private consumption is hit by the loss of purchasing power. Construction and Capex spending are set to deteriorate. Fiscal policy continues to lean against the headwinds but should normalize somewhat. Loan growth, both with corporates and private households, may slow substantially. In a medium-term perspective, we discuss risks for the manufacturing industry and Germany’s geopolitical and competitive position. [more]

No industrial sector in Germany has been affected as severely by the gas shortage and higher gas prices as the chemical industry. The industry's production level in October 2022 was 22.5% lower than in the 4th quarter of 2021. The prospects for the chemical industry in Germany have also deteriorated in the medium term. [more]

GDP: Lower risk of gas shortages but real income shock will bite. Fully replenished gas storages and the larger than expected fiscal support for households suggest that the recession will not be as deep as expected a few weeks ago, although private households will have to cope with a real income shock. [more]

Global sales of semiconductors reached an all-time high in 2021. At the same time, global tensions and growing awareness of the fragility of supply chains have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of global supply chains and semiconductors. We use our Structural Semiconductor Sales Model (3SM) to explore the extent to which government initiatives on digital sovereignty in the US, Europe, and Asia will impact chip manufacturing capacities. In doing so, we calculate structural (i.e., non-cyclical) supply and demand for the period up to 2030. Assuming a continuation of historical supply and demand trends and a further tightening of the ratio of sales to investments (sales-to-capex ratio), it is our forecast that a huge structural demand gap will emerge in 2030 that cannot be closed by the government subsidy programs announced to date. From this perspective, today’s temporary supply chain issues may overlap with or be succeeded by structural shortages. [more]

Europe is in the middle of an energy crisis. It’s grappling with two big challenges at the moment – urgently weaning itself off Russian energy, particularly gas, and moving to a cleaner energy economy. At times, those two goals seem to be in opposition to each other. [more]

German economy: Out in the cold. The real income and confidence shock resulting from the NS1 shutoff as well as the negative real wealth shock of some EUR 1.5 tn will likely send private consumption into a tailspin in 2023. Surging uncertainty and the energy shock causing a slump in competitiveness and profits will put a brake on corporate investment spending, in our opinion. The three fiscal packages and a probable additional one will likely not prevent a GDP slump. Together with a weaker global outlook, we expect the loss in final domestic demand to result in a GDP drop of 3% to 4% in 2023, after an increase of around 1% in 2022. [more]

New Podzept Podcast. The big bust in share prices of Alternative Food stocks has echoes of the dot.com boom & bust in 2000. Yet, just as the bursting of the tech bubble did not stop the inevitable development and adoption of technology, Deutsche Bank Research see the Food Tech revolution as likely continuing despite the cooling of last year’s market euphoria. Olga Cotaga and Luke Templeman, both Thematic Research Analysts, discuss the growth potential in the industry as it continues to simmer, but with the potential to change food as we know it. [more]

From 2035, only climate-neutral passenger cars will be allowed to be registered in the EU. In principle, the course is being set in the direction of battery-electric mobility. However, the option of using e-fuels is not completely off the table. The market shares of electric cars in total new registrations currently vary widely within the EU. Southern and Eastern European countries are lagging behind. To increase the acceptance of e-mobility, the expansion of the charging infrastructure must be widely accelerated. This is a major challenge that also requires the support of the state. The trend towards electric mobility has already triggered a noticeable structural change in Germany as an automotive location. The net impact of this structural change on value creation and employment in Germany is likely to be negative. [more]