Europe

Ensuring sufficient funding for European start-ups forms an integral part of the emerging European Capital Markets Union (CMU). Cost-efficient solutions are necessary to reverse the 40% decline in small IPOs in recent years. To strengthen bank lending to start-ups, reviving the securitisation market and potentially establishing an SME-covered bond market is crucial. Venture capital investments are also subdued – most recently, they were only one tenth of the level in the US. To increase them, institutional investors should be granted more flexibility in their portfolio allocations. Finally, the EU hosts more than 500 crowd funding platforms. A common legal and regulatory approach could stir consolidation and thereby reduce search costs for investors and borrowers alike. [more]

Nearly four years ago, the European Commission set its sights on increasing the share of manufacturing in total gross value added from 15.5% at that time to 20% by 2020. This target will probably not be met. After all, in 2015 the share of manufacturing was only around 15.6% and thus scarcely higher than in 2012. However, industry's contribution to EU output has at least stopped decreasing since 2012. Furthermore, industrial gross value added has picked up (slightly) in the EU in recent years in both nominal and real terms. In a few member states, there have been highly contrasting developments in the significance of manufacturing in the economy. It is striking that the industry share in the three large Eastern Europe member states has increased sharply since 2012. Spain and Italy have reported modest gains. Germany has seen its industry share decline slightly in 2015; however, at 22.8% it still far outstrips the EU average. [more]

Brexit means that the EU is going to lose one of the largest contributors to its budget. The UK paid in a total of EUR 15.1 bn in the first two years of the current budget period 2014-2020, second only to Germany. This is a pattern similar to the previous budget period 2007-2013. [more]

The debate about whether a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) helps or hinders the transmission mechanism of monetary policy continues to rage. The BIS and many others – including us* – long ago issued warnings about throwing open the monetary floodgates and the side effects of negative central-bank interest rates, and now Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England, has also clearly rejected negative interest rates, despite using all the means at his disposal to prevent the UK economy from sliding into recession after the Brexit shock. The package of measures he launched in August significantly exceeded market expectations, but Carney has ruled out negative interest rates, referring to the adverse impact on the capital markets. [more]

The European banking industry has gone into reverse gear this year so far, following substantial progress in 2014 and 2015. Its revenues and profits have relapsed into contraction, and the potential for lower loan loss provisions to come to the rescue seems exhausted. Once more, cost cuts have not kept pace with the retreat on the income side. In a market environment that continues to be very challenging, banks may have to resort to even tougher measures to put themselves on a sustainable footing again. [more]

The mid-term review of the EU’s multiannual financial framework 2014-2020 is scheduled for the end of 2016. The scenario of a Brexit taking effect in the upcoming years and the potential impact thereof might well be discussed as part of the review. However, given current uncertainties about timing and circumstances of the UK leaving the European Union, it is still too early to fully adapt accounts. Yet, two things seem certain for the time being: First, a Brexit taking effect during the second half of the budgetary planning period would certainly prompt the need for further adjustments. Second, it would also affect funding for regional and cohesion policy as one of the largest EU budgetary items. [more]

Is Brexit going to impact on the EU investment plan? The short answer is „yes“. But the more interesting question is how it is going to play out both on the day-to-day operations, progress with the plan and the future of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in particular. [more]

The issue of future EU-UK relations has many facets. Among those widely overlooked so far are the consequences for the coordination of social security systems. Will the EU’s social and labour law-related standards still apply in the UK after Brexit? Will British pensioners living in France or Spain still be allowed to reside there and to receive a full pension? What about EU citizens’ access to services from Britain’s National Health Service (NHS)? Will bankers who have migrated from London to Frankfurt still be eligible to receive the German child benefit for their children who stayed behind? [more]

One of the widely discussed patterns of the UK-referendum vote is its demographic distribution. Some surveys find that voters older than 65 were more than twice as likely to have opted for “leave” than those younger than 25 years.* Demographic differences with respect to perceptions of Europe are not unique to the UK. [more]

Following the UK referendum, Brexit will also leave traces on German industry. After all, 7.5% of all German exports went to the UK in 2015, making it Germany’s third most important export market after the United States and France. The automotive and pharmaceutical industries are likely to be hit the hardest by Brexit. This is because the UK accounts for 12.8% and 10.5%, respectively, of these two industries’ total exports. In addition, they both generally have an above-average export ratio. The UK referendum is likely to have an impact on individual companies’ investment decisions and German companies’ UK pricing structures in the short term. [more]