Europe

Accelerated by the consequences of the financial/economic and migration crisis, the influence of anti-European, anti-migration movements with a populist playbook in the EU is growing. For the EU, the next crucial stocktaking of voters’ sentiment will be the 2019 elections for the European Parliament on 23-26 May. The European political landscape and with it the composition of national parliaments in the EU member states has changed over the last five years and in some countries substantially so. These shifts can be expected to be reflected in the next European Parliament as well, and – as already the case in the Council – impact European policymaking. [more]

The European banking industry remains in restructuring mode. Most institutions are focused on increasing profitability and returns to shareholders. In contrast to previous periods of rising net income, the key this time is exiting less attractive parts of their business rather than expanding across the board. Hence, most P&L and balance sheet components have declined year-over-year, with one major exception: profits. Capital levels have suffered from new, more conservative accounting rules on loan loss provisions. [more]

During the last few years, the expansion of digital infrastructure in the EU has been carried out more slowly and less comprehensively than politically intended. The EU’s objective of ensuring fast broadband coverage of more than 30 megabits per second for all Europeans by 2020 seems out of reach. There are economic and regulatory reasons for the insufficient progress with digital infrastructure improvements. However, inadequate digital infrastructure puts companies at a disadvantage versus US competitors, but increasingly also versus Chinese players. The European Commission estimates that more than EUR 500 bn will need to be invested by 2025 to achieve the goal of a “gigabit society”. [more]

The European Parliament's Environment Committee agreed on setting stricter CO₂ emission limit values for new passenger cars. By 2030, CO₂ emissions shall be reduced by 45% compared with 2021. The targets overshoot the mark. Besides lacking economic efficiency, they are ineffective in terms of meeting the ecological goals. [more]

The constraints that forced a rapid slowing of euro area GDP growth momentum from 3% to 2% annualized in H1 — the pass through of earlier FX appreciation, the slowing of exports to China, the rise of the oil price — have eased or reversed somewhat, helping stabilize the economy through mid-year. Whether this can be maintained is a function of still-robust fundamentals (cyclical and structural drivers) vs. accumulating risk factors. [more]

European banks had a patchy start to the year. The common theme of Q1 performance was the continued slight shrinkage of the industry, visible in many core indicators. Overall results were solid though, showing further progress in asset quality and resilience in light of tighter regulation (IFRS 9). [more]

The recent dispute among the German center/conservative parties, i.e. among the CDU and the CSU, has highlighted the issue of secondary migration within the EU. The intra-EU migration of asylum seekers is especially relevant for Germany, the major destination of these movements. [more]

The UK’s exit from the EU will have significant repercussions for the financial industry, notably investment banking. London as the primary European hub is likely to lose its full access to the single market. Currently, financial services exports play a major role for Britain and almost half of them go to the EU. Without the surplus it generates from providing investment banking services to EU customers, Britain’s current account deficit would be 40% higher. Following Brexit and the likely loss of the single European passport, non-EU banks will have to set up or build-out subsidiaries in the EU-27 with own capital, liquidity, corporate governance and fully-fledged operations. This could lead to an additional EUR 35-45 bn of capital being ‘ring-fenced’. This represents a further leg of banking balkanisation with trapped capital, liquidity and resources – profitability will be under pressure and not all EU business models will be viable. [more]

With the new Payment Services Directive ("PSD 2") of the EU, which entered into force on 13 January 2018, payment services in Europe have become the frontrunner of "open banking". Account holders can request, free of charge, that banks transmit their financial data in digital form to third parties. Furthermore, they can authorise third-party providers to initiate payments from their bank account. Personal data are owned by the data subject – this principle also forms the basis of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Under the latter, however, there is no obligation to provide a technical solution through which customers can transmit their personal data to third-party providers in a convenient manner. In contrast to the PSD 2, the GDPR is therefore unlikely to stimulate innovation and competition in payments. In the financial sector, competition will thus be distorted. Banks must grant competitors access to customer data and their payment infrastructure, whereas internet platforms, for instance, de facto retain sovereignty over the personal data of their customers as well as access to their platforms. [more]

The European Council meeting on June 28-29 is fraught with expectation of a breakthrough on EA reforms. However, while the aim of strengthening the resilience of the euro area is shared, means, scope and sequencing of action remain subject to debate. Also, it is open how the change of the political leadership in parts of the EA will affect the process. [more]