English version of ˮSustainable Finance wird erwachsenˮ

Banks’ domestic sovereign exposures in the euro area ballooned during the financial and European debt crises but have markedly declined since then. Still, with 5% of total assets and 76% of capital, they remain considerable and a risk on bank balance sheets, especially in light of the general exemption from capital requirements and concentration limits. Risk parameters differ between national banking markets, and the home bias remains high, at around 80%, as banks hardly diversify into other euro-area debt. The cross-country differences make it difficult for policymakers to agree on a fully mutualized European Deposit Insurance Scheme and thus complete the Banking Union. [more]

Climate stress tests have emerged as a key tool for looking into the financial system’s vulnerability to climate risks. Banks’ exposure to climate risks stems from (1) physical risks that are closely related to geography, and (2) transition risks mainly from loans to carbon-intensive sectors. Exercises by the ECB and BoE suggest that banks’ credit losses in a disorderly transition would be higher than in an orderly transition scenario, and even higher in a “hot house world” with unabated global warming. Banks would be able to absorb climate-related losses due to strong capital buffers. Results are subject to data limitations and modelling constraints. So far, climate stress tests are declared learning exercises with no direct implications for capital requirements. However, supervisors are urging banks to set up a comprehensive climate risk management. [more]

In 2021, stablecoins’ market capitalization increased multifold to USD 170 bn. More importantly, they are the most traded coins in the entire crypto space and crucial for decentralized finance (DeFi). In the future, stablecoins could also gain traction in the real world – adding to the competition in the fields of retail and corporate payments. Stablecoins differ considerably in their price stabilization mechanisms and can pose risks, which have come into the spotlight of regulators. [more]

Over 101 billion non-cash payments were made in the euro area in 2020, a meagre increase of 3.7%, which mainly reflects a slump in growth of card payments. However, depending on the country and on the payment situation, there were different trends during the pandemic. At the till, payment habits are converging towards card use. In online shopping, national differences (card or e-payment solution) seem to become more pronounced. [more]

The introduction of a digital euro is drawing closer: as a digital version of cash it is primarily intended to be a means of payment rather than an instrument for investment. The ECB wants to strengthen Europe’s sovereignty in the world of payments as well as the euro’s competitive position vis-à-vis other currencies. However, this will only be achieved if the digital euro is used widely, which is not very likely. A limit is expected on how much users can hold, to prevent a massive outflow of bank deposits into digital central bank money. In this case, lending decisions and money creation would eventually shift to the ECB. Europe would face the question which type of monetary and financial system it wants. [more]

The coronavirus pandemic has caused a surge in public debt and highlights the need to tackle sovereign risk on bank balance sheets, which remains a threat to the stability of the Banking Union. Euro-area banks hold bonds and have granted loans to their domestic sovereigns worth a combined EUR 2.1 tr, equalling 6.2% of total assets. Among the largest countries, banks in Italy have the highest exposure relative to capital (194%), followed by Spain (105%), whereas it is much lower in Germany (67%) and France (60%). Sovereign risk must be mitigated to finalise the Banking Union but this will require some honest acknowledgements by supervisors and entail restrictions for banks and politicians. [more]

In its industrial policy strategy, the European Commission has merged the goal of reinforcing Europe’s industrial sovereignty and global competitiveness with its overarching objective: the twin transition to a green and digital economy. Close cooperation between the industry, governments and academia is necessary to meet these ambitions and open questions regarding the realisation and compatibility of the policy objectives need to be addressed along the way. During the pandemic, the role of the state in the EU economies has strengthened substantially. Hot political debates about normalising the market mechanism and reinstating state aid rules can be expected over the next years. Risks are that even post-COVID, there might be calls for continued exemptions to the European state aid and competition rules. This could lead to lasting distortions of the single market. [more]

Large banks in Europe have taken a substantial hit from the recession induced by the coronavirus. Their revenues dropped 5% yoy in the first half of the year and loan loss provisions spiked, essentially wiping out profits. Nevertheless, the CET1 ratio increased to 14% and the leverage ratio dipped only slightly to 4.8%. Total assets surged, driven by a massive increase in liquidity reserves at central banks, a boom in corporate lending and substantial government bond purchases. By comparison, the major US banks have weathered the crisis somewhat better so far. They remained moderately profitable, despite setting aside more funds to cover future loan losses. Their revenues grew 2% yoy, a stronger headwind from the Fed’s interest rate cuts notwithstanding. Capital ratios, however, appear less resilient than in Europe. [more]

The EUR 750 bn recovery package agreed upon by EU leaders two weeks ago will be financed through EU borrowing while the EUR 1,074 bn budget for the next seven years mainly depends on EU members' direct contributions. For the Commission to tap markets, the own resources ceiling – i.e. the maximum amount that can be called per year to finance EU expenditure – will be temporarily increased from the current 1.2% to 2% of EU members’ GNI. The Council committed itself to reform the EU’s financing system and plans to introduce new own resources for early repayment of EU borrowing. The top priority at present is swift adoption of the budget and recovery fund to address the consequences of the pandemic over the coming years. Following agreement in the Council, the MFF 2021-2027 now requires the consent of the European Parliament, in an absolute-majority vote. The decision about own resources – EU borrowing, increased ceiling and new own resources – needs to be approved by all member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements (including approval by national parliaments). While we do not expect an overall blockage of the package by the European Parliament or member states, delays cannot be excluded. [more]

EU leaders finally reached what looked impossible at times: agreement on a EUR 1.074 trillion next seven-year EU budget as well as a EUR 750 bn European recovery fund, consisting of EUR 390 bn in grants and EUR 360 bn in loans. In order to engineer consensus, Council President Michel repeatedly adjusted (downsized) his original proposal to meet the demands of frugal members. The EUR 390 bn grants facility agreed is a significant cut compared to the EUR 500 bn called for by France and Germany, but the share of grants in the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was slightly increased to EUR 312.5 bn The Council meeting that lasted from Friday to Tuesday was the first in-person conference between EU leaders since the outbreak of the Corona pandemic and took place under heightened health precautions. In the end, leaders of 27 EU members managed to find a joint response to the unprecedented economic challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis. [more]

The coronavirus recession results in large-scale balance sheet changes both at euro-area and US banks. At the peak of the slump, lending to companies and corporate deposits surged further, while lending to households was much less affected. Banks also strongly increased their funding from and liquidity buffers at central banks. Within the euro area, funding from the ECB rose particularly in Germany and France, but remains much more important in Italy and Spain. Purchases of government bonds by US banks were smaller and started later than in the EMU. Over the next couple of months, corporate loans and deposits may gradually come down both in the US and Europe. Banks’ liquidity reserves at central banks are set to decrease, while their government bond holdings are expected to rise considerably. [more]

The press statement of European Council President Michel after yesterday’s video conference of EU leaders remained vague on the EU’s joint fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis. EU leaders endorsed their earlier agreement on the EUR 540 bn package of safety nets and also agreed “to work towards establishing a recovery fund”, asking the Commission to rapidly prepare a proposal of what this requires. Interlinking the EU's recovery plan with the budget might add another layer of complexity but could also serve as a spur for rapid agreements on both matters. [more]