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English version of ˮAusblick auf den deutschen Wohnungsmarkt 2022 ff.: Überbewertungen nehmen zu, Zyklusende ist nah, im Basisszenario verhaltene Preiskorrekturˮ

May 10, 2022
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We expect the German residential property market cycle to come to an end during the current decade. A combination of our different approaches suggests that, despite the uncertainties, the cycle will probably end in 2024. Prices will not necessarily undergo a massive correction from their peak, our baseline scenario foresees an isolated ending of the cycle. As migration inflows were low and new construction activity has been dynamic during the pandemic, fundamental supply shortages are a thing of the past for many German cities. The current refugee wave will only temporarily weigh on the market. [more]

More documents from Jochen Moebert

97 Documents
November 23, 2022
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1
Semiconductors rank first as the most traded goods in global trade statistics in 2020, representing 15% of total global trade in goods. Before 2015, they were surpassed by computers and crude oil, based on the HS4 categorization by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Prices for semiconductors have fallen dramatically and steadily since 1995, both in real and nominal terms. Our new Trade Chain Complexity Index (TCC Index) allows for a comparison of the ratio of global trade with sales of various goods. For semiconductors, the TCC Index shows a peak of 7.2 for 2008. Since then, the complexity value has steadily decreased with a value of 5.9 for 2020. This trend might be the first sign of more cautious supply chain strategies in a challenging macro environment - and a downward trend for semiconductor globalization in a new era of digital sovereignty. [more]
November 22, 2022
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2
GDP: Lower risk of gas shortages but real income shock will bite. Fully replenished gas storages and the larger than expected fiscal support for households suggest that the recession will not be as deep as expected a few weeks ago, although private households will have to cope with a real income shock. [more]
November 1, 2022
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3
Global sales of semiconductors reached an all-time high in 2021. At the same time, global tensions and growing awareness of the fragility of supply chains have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of global supply chains and semiconductors. We use our Structural Semiconductor Sales Model (3SM) to explore the extent to which government initiatives on digital sovereignty in the US, Europe, and Asia will impact chip manufacturing capacities. In doing so, we calculate structural (i.e., non-cyclical) supply and demand for the period up to 2030. Assuming a continuation of historical supply and demand trends and a further tightening of the ratio of sales to investments (sales-to-capex ratio), it is our forecast that a huge structural demand gap will emerge in 2030 that cannot be closed by the government subsidy programs announced to date. From this perspective, today’s temporary supply chain issues may overlap with or be succeeded by structural shortages. [more]
September 27, 2022
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4
German economy: Out in the cold. The real income and confidence shock resulting from the NS1 shutoff as well as the negative real wealth shock of some EUR 1.5 tn will likely send private consumption into a tailspin in 2023. Surging uncertainty and the energy shock causing a slump in competitiveness and profits will put a brake on corporate investment spending, in our opinion. The three fiscal packages and a probable additional one will likely not prevent a GDP slump. Together with a weaker global outlook, we expect the loss in final domestic demand to result in a GDP drop of 3% to 4% in 2023, after an increase of around 1% in 2022. [more]
July 21, 2022
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6
Germany's current account is in flux. Currently, the "terms of trade" shock is reducing the surplus in the goods balance. But structural factors such as the reduced importance of industry and demographics also point to lower surpluses. In addition, we expect a further narrowing of the deficits in the services balance. The surpluses from the primary and secondary balance, on the other hand, are likely to increase further. In total, the current account ratio will fall sharply in 2022, especially measured in terms of GDP, and will also tend to be significantly lower than in the past thereafter. Accordingly, criticism of Germany's surpluses is likely to become increasingly muted. [more]
May 5, 2022
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8
In 2021, global sales in the semiconductor industry reached an all-time high of USD 556 bn. Despite this record figure, the industry currently faces severe challenges as the present semiconductor cycle is characterized by a triple whammy: Huge demand due to a boost for digitalization, COVID-related and non-COVID related supply shortages and geopolitical tensions. Due to the sharp rise in chip demand, new chip factories are currently being built in the US, Asia and Europe to meet rising demand over the next decade. We think, the present sales cycle will be extraordinary long. [more]
March 4, 2022
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9
War in Ukraine – slowing but not ending the German recovery. In a moderate economic scenario (which is our new baseline forecast) we expect German GDP to grow by between 2 ½% and 3% (old forecast 4%). Surging energy prices should push the annual inflation rate to around 5 ½% in 2022. Government spending is expected to be ramped up by 1 ¼ and 1 ½ pp, limiting the overall growth loss. In a more severe scenario headline inflation could rise to between 6 ½% and 7%, as oil and gas deliveries are at least temporarily halted. Annual GDP growth should be a meagre 1% to 1 ½%. [more]
December 15, 2021
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10
4% GDP growth in 2022, despite technical recession in winter half. A synchronous acceleration should result in annual GDP growth of 4%. In 2023, quarterly GDP growth will slow towards trend. In fiscal policy ambitious spending plans and debt brake commitment lead to open funding questions. Based on the previous fiscal regime, the fiscal deficit is set to narrow considerably. Still, the new government’s big spending plans, which are not yet quantifiable, could drive deficits considerably higher. Inflation decelerating from 5%+ rates, but higher core rate more permanent. Carryover effects and cost pressures will keep CPI inflation elevated. In 2023, headline and core rates are unlikely to fall below 2%. German politics 2022: “Team Scholz” will focus on climate protection and sizeable corporate tax allowances for green and digital investments. German EU policy might be less fiscal orthodox and open to a cautious reform of the EU’s fiscal rules. [more]
October 8, 2021
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11
Never since reunification have industrial companies in Germany complained as much about material bottlenecks as they do at present. In addition to physical shortages of intermediate products, rising prices are also currently problematic for companies. This is reflected in producer prices. In August 2021, they were around 12% higher than a year earlier – the biggest increase since December 1974. The latest development is not a German phenomenon. In many countries around the world, the current economic recovery is being dampened by supply bottlenecks and higher prices. Supply bottlenecks and rising prices for intermediate goods are hampering the economic recovery in the manufacturing sector. Here, new orders in August 2021 exceeded the production level by close to 22%. Overall, we expect supply chain disruptions to keep us busy into 2022, although the low point in the supply crisis may be behind us. [more]
September 15, 2021
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12
In terms of housing policy concepts in Germany, there are only minor overlaps between the plans of left-wing and right-wing parties. The CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the AfD continue to support supply-oriented housing policies. The SPD, the Greens, and the Left prefer demand-oriented approaches. The CDU and the FDP promise to reduce price and rent pressure by providing additional supply and to offer incentives for renovation and retrofitting. People who are living in a rented home and do not want to move will probably find the plans of the SPD, the Left or the Greens attractive. Private households might see the ancillary costs of buying a home decline after the elections, as opposed to large-scale investors. Overall, none of the parties has prepared a comprehensive concept. And none of them has paid attention to what their demands may mean in terms of necessary labour, funds, space, etc. [more]
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