Housing policy in Germany Changing direction

We showed in March that, in Germany, house prices have kept up with inflation during periods with high inflation and that, over decades, house prices have increased even faster than consumer prices. Here, we extend the analysis to other countries. [more]

The boom is over. Five key arguments lead us to expect only a price dip. Negative real interest rates, inflation protection through real estate, rising rental growth and most importantly a high fundamental supply shortage. In addition, real house prices have already fallen very sharply due to the surge in inflation. CO2 emissions from buildings are increasingly coming into focus. Prices have started to diverge between properties with low and high emissions. This divergence is likely to increase. [more]

Fighting inflation is high on the ECB’s agenda. If inflation remains elevated, additional rate increases could pose challenges in the housing markets. Given their size and importance, this would likely have ramifications for macro-financial stability. [more]

The German economy – one year after. With surprisingly strong hard data for January, chances are rising that GDP might be saved from another decline in Q1. Although not yet our baseline call, this would prevent Germany from going through a technical recession. However, still heightened uncertainty and real income losses due to high inflation will likely keep investment spending and private consumption flatlining in the first half of the year. Hence, we maintain our 0% forecast for 2023 German GDP growth, although upside risks have increased since the start of the year. [more]

We calculate a nominal and real return triangle for German house prices from 1970 to 2022. The market offered an inflation hedge in the past. This is in particular true for periods of high inflation as in these periods house prices even exceeded inflation. The huge supply shortage and rising rents are further arguments for a bottoming out of house prices in 2023. [more]

We look at the expected recession in the winter half-year 2022/23 and the onset of recovery, how inflation will peak, while the labor market loses momentum and private consumption is hit by the loss of purchasing power. Construction and Capex spending are set to deteriorate. Fiscal policy continues to lean against the headwinds but should normalize somewhat. Loan growth, both with corporates and private households, may slow substantially. In a medium-term perspective, we discuss risks for the manufacturing industry and Germany’s geopolitical and competitive position. [more]

Semiconductors rank first as the most traded goods in global trade statistics in 2020, representing 15% of total global trade in goods. Before 2015, they were surpassed by computers and crude oil, based on the HS4 categorization by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Prices for semiconductors have fallen dramatically and steadily since 1995, both in real and nominal terms. Our new Trade Chain Complexity Index (TCC Index) allows for a comparison of the ratio of global trade with sales of various goods. For semiconductors, the TCC Index shows a peak of 7.2 for 2008. Since then, the complexity value has steadily decreased with a value of 5.9 for 2020. This trend might be the first sign of more cautious supply chain strategies in a challenging macro environment - and a downward trend for semiconductor globalization in a new era of digital sovereignty. [more]

GDP: Lower risk of gas shortages but real income shock will bite. Fully replenished gas storages and the larger than expected fiscal support for households suggest that the recession will not be as deep as expected a few weeks ago, although private households will have to cope with a real income shock. [more]

Global sales of semiconductors reached an all-time high in 2021. At the same time, global tensions and growing awareness of the fragility of supply chains have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of global supply chains and semiconductors. We use our Structural Semiconductor Sales Model (3SM) to explore the extent to which government initiatives on digital sovereignty in the US, Europe, and Asia will impact chip manufacturing capacities. In doing so, we calculate structural (i.e., non-cyclical) supply and demand for the period up to 2030. Assuming a continuation of historical supply and demand trends and a further tightening of the ratio of sales to investments (sales-to-capex ratio), it is our forecast that a huge structural demand gap will emerge in 2030 that cannot be closed by the government subsidy programs announced to date. From this perspective, today’s temporary supply chain issues may overlap with or be succeeded by structural shortages. [more]

German economy: Out in the cold. The real income and confidence shock resulting from the NS1 shutoff as well as the negative real wealth shock of some EUR 1.5 tn will likely send private consumption into a tailspin in 2023. Surging uncertainty and the energy shock causing a slump in competitiveness and profits will put a brake on corporate investment spending, in our opinion. The three fiscal packages and a probable additional one will likely not prevent a GDP slump. Together with a weaker global outlook, we expect the loss in final domestic demand to result in a GDP drop of 3% to 4% in 2023, after an increase of around 1% in 2022. [more]

Rising mortgage rates and shortages of building materials led to a shock of uncertainty in the housing market over the last months. But there are many countervailing effects. Hence, it is not set in stone that the house price cycle comes to an end. [more]

Germany's current account is in flux. Currently, the "terms of trade" shock is reducing the surplus in the goods balance. But structural factors such as the reduced importance of industry and demographics also point to lower surpluses. In addition, we expect a further narrowing of the deficits in the services balance. The surpluses from the primary and secondary balance, on the other hand, are likely to increase further. In total, the current account ratio will fall sharply in 2022, especially measured in terms of GDP, and will also tend to be significantly lower than in the past thereafter. Accordingly, criticism of Germany's surpluses is likely to become increasingly muted. [more]