Eric Heymann

With Q1 GDP growth revised to -0.3% we now expect annual GDP to shrink by 0.3% in 2023. With the expected US recession weighing on German economic momentum towards year end we have cut our annual forecast for GDP growth in 2024 to 0.5% from 1.0%. Meanwhile, the energy transition policy is putting strains on government cohesion, as can be seen from the failure to agree on a piece of climate legislation this week. Spending pressures and debt-brake limits add to tensions. Still, none of the three ruling parties has an incentive to trigger early elections. [more]

The costs of electricity generation of different energy sources are often debated. Often, however, no distinction is made as to which specific costs are meant. While renewable energies have marginal costs close to zero and very competitive levelized costs of electricity, a high and increasing share of weather-dependent renewables leads to system costs. They result, for example, from the provision of back-up power plants and the falling average capacity utilization of all existing power plants. We discuss the different types of costs of power generation and note that investments in renewables are easier to realize than the construction of new back-up power plants. [more]

In the first edition of our Energy Transition Monitor, we take stock of the current speed of renewables rollout, e-car uptake, heat-pump installations, and energy infrastructure build-up (e.g., regarding hydrogen) in Germany. We then analyse existing bottlenecks for reaching envisaged targets for 2030. Finally, we provide an update of current policy action aimed at mitigating those bottlenecks, both at the EU and national level, and potential implications of these policy measures on investment spending (private and public). [more]

The German economy – one year after. With surprisingly strong hard data for January, chances are rising that GDP might be saved from another decline in Q1. Although not yet our baseline call, this would prevent Germany from going through a technical recession. However, still heightened uncertainty and real income losses due to high inflation will likely keep investment spending and private consumption flatlining in the first half of the year. Hence, we maintain our 0% forecast for 2023 German GDP growth, although upside risks have increased since the start of the year. [more]

Despite the lower absolute energy imports, Germany had to pay significantly more for its imports because of higher prices. Total primary energy demand in Germany fell by just under 5% in 2022. Oil, coal, and renewables have expanded their share in primary energy demand, while natural gas and nuclear energy have lost importance. [more]

We look at the expected recession in the winter half-year 2022/23 and the onset of recovery, how inflation will peak, while the labor market loses momentum and private consumption is hit by the loss of purchasing power. Construction and Capex spending are set to deteriorate. Fiscal policy continues to lean against the headwinds but should normalize somewhat. Loan growth, both with corporates and private households, may slow substantially. In a medium-term perspective, we discuss risks for the manufacturing industry and Germany’s geopolitical and competitive position. [more]

No industrial sector in Germany has been affected as severely by the gas shortage and higher gas prices as the chemical industry. The industry's production level in October 2022 was 22.5% lower than in the 4th quarter of 2021. The prospects for the chemical industry in Germany have also deteriorated in the medium term. [more]

GDP: Lower risk of gas shortages but real income shock will bite. Fully replenished gas storages and the larger than expected fiscal support for households suggest that the recession will not be as deep as expected a few weeks ago, although private households will have to cope with a real income shock. [more]

German economy: Out in the cold. The real income and confidence shock resulting from the NS1 shutoff as well as the negative real wealth shock of some EUR 1.5 tn will likely send private consumption into a tailspin in 2023. Surging uncertainty and the energy shock causing a slump in competitiveness and profits will put a brake on corporate investment spending, in our opinion. The three fiscal packages and a probable additional one will likely not prevent a GDP slump. Together with a weaker global outlook, we expect the loss in final domestic demand to result in a GDP drop of 3% to 4% in 2023, after an increase of around 1% in 2022. [more]

Greenflation is inevitable. And it has become a more acute issue this year since many countries, particularly in Europe, have increased their efforts to expand renewables and reduce their dependence on Russian energy. [more]

Moving into recession. A likely further decline in Russian gas supply after the maintenance of NS1 will necessitate additional savings. While we do not expect a full rationing, we believe the economic consequences will together with a US recession and other headwinds push Germany into a recession in H2 2022. Given that prospects for Russian gas deliveries have darkened since February, this energy shock will not hit Germany by surprise or unprepared. Hence, we expect a modest but rather drawn-out GDP decline, as the economy gradually adjusts. After a 1 ¼% expansion in 2022, German GDP will shrink by around 1% in 2023, largely because consumers will not be able to offset the real income loss by further dissaving. In a “tap remains turned off” scenario, we expect a rationing of gas leading to a GDP slump between 5% and 6% in 2023. [more]

From 2035, only climate-neutral passenger cars will be allowed to be registered in the EU. In principle, the course is being set in the direction of battery-electric mobility. However, the option of using e-fuels is not completely off the table. The market shares of electric cars in total new registrations currently vary widely within the EU. Southern and Eastern European countries are lagging behind. To increase the acceptance of e-mobility, the expansion of the charging infrastructure must be widely accelerated. This is a major challenge that also requires the support of the state. The trend towards electric mobility has already triggered a noticeable structural change in Germany as an automotive location. The net impact of this structural change on value creation and employment in Germany is likely to be negative. [more]