1. Research
7. Dezember 2022
People often ask me how we choose our themes of the year ahead. It is not a hard science, but there is a framework we use. It starts by asking the following question: “What policies and developments in the economic, business, and political world are unsustainable, and what will it take for them to become sustainable?”. [mehr]
Deutsche Bank Research #PositiveImpact Top 10 themes for 2023 Contents 1 . Which pivot is more important in 2023? .....................................................4 2. 2023: a year of relative political stability....................................................5 3. The weaponisation of trade..........................................................................6 4. Semiconductors in 2023: a not so 'semi' decoupling...............................7 5. If Tech is the new value, what is the new growth?....................................8 6. The new 60/40: risk exposure trumps correlations..................................9 7. A bifurcation in property market: US v Rest of the world.....................10 8. Precision agriculture: a precise solution to food security......................11 9. "Give me your data"- cyberattacks, the bigger new bully in 2023.....12 10. When to price in good news......................................................................13 Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 3 Top ten themes for 2023 - summary People often ask me how we choose our themes of the year ahead. It is not a hard science, but there is a framework we use and it starts by asking three questions. First, "What policies and developments in the economic, business, and political world are unsustainable, and what will it take for them to become sustainable?". Second, "Where are people anchored to recency bias?" Third, "What is growing that people underestimate?" Asking these three questions always triggers an avalanche of ideas and tangential conversations. From here we select the ten themes we think have the most potential to affect a broad range of markets. What about timing? We call these our ten themes for 2023, however, when they impact markets can be variable. Reviewing our ten ideas for 2022, six were reasonably accurate, two were not, and the other two are yet to play out. Of course, I do not expect the ideas in this edition to be the exact and exclusive predictions that dominate 2023. But our ideas are not specific predictions per se. Rather, they are the themes around which we think several markets may move - not just one. So even if you disagree with any of our ideas, we hope that they will at least provoke an interesting discussion about the direction of markets, economics, business, and politics next year. Luke Templeman Director, Thematic Research Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 4 Arguably, the two most important drivers of markets in 2022 were the Fed raising interest rates and China's zero-covid policy. That means 2023 may be defined by the extent to which both of these pivot. In the end, neither the Fed, nor China, are likely to formally announce a full pivot. Rather, both will likely manage a 'soft pivot' that drip feeds easier policy into their respective economies. That is because the consequences of an abrupt change for both could be severely negative. In the US, the Fed likely cannot let anyone think it is easing up given inflation is forecast to be at 4.7 per cent in June 2023. Meanwhile in China, limited hospital capacity means an abrupt end to covid restrictions could overload health services. In both countries, a 'soft pivot' will likely take the shape of increased tolerance for the problem, against a backdrop of hard talk. In the US, the Fed will continue to talk a tough game on inflation, however, as inflation falls, it may consider easing shadow rates, or accepting some above-target price growth (which would help inflate away government debt). In China, the tolerance for new cases in certain areas may gradually rise, particularly in key economic regions. Acquired immunity will gradually make covid less of a threat. How will each key indicator perform after a 'soft pivot'? By the end of next year, US inflation should fall to 4.0 per cent. Meanwhile, Chinese GDP should rise 'just' 3.4 per cent, a level close to multi-decade lows. In other words, both economies are likely to miss the targets for their respective economic indicators. Potential upside comes from how a simultaneous 'soft pivot' by each country might help the other. That would be opposite to what happened this year when the actions of both countries hurt the other. Specifically, higher interest rate expectations in the US certainly contributed to flows of foreign investment into China being cut almost in half in the June quarter compared with the previous one . Meanwhile, China's zero-covid policy led to a shortage of supply of many manufactured goods in the US. The mutual reliance may act as something of a buffer and incentive, at least in the short term. As both pivots are likely to be gradual, markets may not experience a spectacular one-off rally. Rather, it may be a volatile path to higher asset prices as investors struggle to pinpoint an exact pivot moment. Consider that most people can identify 15 September 2008 as the day that sparked the full-blown financial crisis. Yet investors disagree on whether it ended in, say, July 2009 when the US recession officially ended, in April 2013 when the S&P 500 regained its pre-crisis peak, in December 2015 when the Fed finally raised rates, or perhaps another date altogether. So not knowing when the US and China will officially pivot is okay. In fact, it would be an entirely normal end to an economic crisis. Which pivot is more important in 2023? - Luke Templeman Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 0 100 200 300 400 500 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. from Baker, Bloom & Davis, Deutsche Bank 1 OECD Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 5 2023: a year of relative political stability - Henry Allen Number of G7 countries with a major election that year 0 1 2 3 4 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023* Note: *assuming no snap elections Source: Deutsche Bank Next year may prove to be a more stable period in global politics than we have grown used to in recent years. Barring any snap elections, 2023 will be the first of the 21st century without a general or presidential election in any G7 country. With this in mind, a (temporary) pause is likely in election campaigns and leadership transitions. The result: leaders will be able to spend (comparatively) more of their time addressing current challenges. Incentives currently favour stability. That is especially the case in light of recent global market volatility and the prospect of a looming recession. The gilt crisis in the UK this autumn was a demonstration of how both economies and political parties can rapidly be pushed to the brink when markets are in a febrile mood. Some cited those events as an example of what to avoid. For instance, when Germany unveiled its plan to freeze gas prices, Finance Minister Lindner said: "we are explicitly not following the UK's example." Elsewhere in Europe, newly-elected Italian Prime Minister Meloni sought to reassure partners that she will be cautious with the public finances. Importantly, following Liz Truss' resignation as prime minister, her replacement, Rishi Sunak pledged to "place economic stability and confidence at the heart of this government's agenda." Even his political rivals called for party unity. With politicians having plenty on their plate at home, incentives for stability will also be evident on the international stage. Most notably, efforts are underway to ease tensions between the US and China. At the G20 summit in Bali, Presidents Biden and Xi met in person for the first time as leaders, and the results were generally considered to have exceeded expectations. The White House said both leaders had "agreed to empower key senior officials" to communicate on issues such as climate change, food security, and global macroeconomic stability. It was agreed that US Secretary of State Blinken will make a follow-up visit to China. The will to foster stability has been noticed in the broad reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Even countries who have previously been closer to Russia have suggested their disquiet with the conflict and a desire for peace. For example, in September Russian President Putin acknowledged "questions and your concerns" as he met Xi. On top of that, Indian Prime Minister Modi publicly said to Putin that "today's era is not of war". The sole fact that Russia has been internationally upbraided to the extent it has, demonstrates its behaviour has been an outlier. The idea that "stability is destabilising" is widely attributed to the economist Hyman Minsky. His view was that periods of stability contribute to more risk-taking, which itself breeds future instability and crises as individuals grow complacent. The logic can work in reverse too, since periods of instability lead to greater caution, and themselves lay the foundations for more stability in the future. This thought can also be applied to politics. There is a strong case that 2023 will prove to be a more stable year. Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 6 Several taboos were broken this year in how trade is used as a weapon. That sets up 2023 to be a year when countries may test new ways to weaponise their economic advantages. Consider the new tactics utilised in trade disputes this year. First and foremost, the US froze foreign currency reserves held by Russia's central bank. It also used its control of payment systems to restrict Russia's access to trade. In addition, wealthy Russian expats had their assets expropriated by various western countries. Meanwhile, many western companies self-sanctioned. In turn, Russia broke new ground in restricting commodity exports. Europe is now scrambling to find alternative natural gas supplies On top of that, many countries have been at risk from restrictions on food exports from ports in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the US also upped the ante on China and implemented a host of new restrictions on technology exports and dealing with companies tied to the military. As we look into 2023, countries may further push the barriers on the types of economic capabilities they can use as trade weapons. Many could be considered. Some perhaps could come in the form of new multi-country buyer cartels, restrictions on the supply of rare earth metals and other green transition commodities, the nationalisation of foreign companies, further restrictions on foreign workers, and adoption of digital currencies. What happens if other countries decide to flex their muscle against the US? Western expats living in 'competitor' countries are not used to having their assets expropriated. Meanwhile, any restriction on dealing with US companies connected to the military could be very broad reaching. After all, the US military-industrial complex is so vast that a large number of companies are either suppliers to the military or suppliers to those suppliers. As more economic factors are weaponised it is possible that the established sanctions strategy will move away from 'particularisation'. That is to say, the current sanctions playbook leans more towards restrictions on particular individuals and companies, whilst trade continues for everyone else. But as economic disagreements grow more intense, this will likely spread to encompass more of a country's economy and push the world towards a multi-polar state. A world with three or four powers all flexing their muscle means less globalisation and less growth. Indeed, the right-hand chart shows that economic cycles tend to be the longest when the world is dominated by a single power. The new world means increased premiums and hedging costs on assets that cross the multi-polar divide. It means nearshoring and friendshoring. It also means recreating industries at home that were previously deemed too expensive to host. The worrying thing is that as countries become more self sufficient, there is less incentive to pursue a compromise with difficult trade partners. Number of corporate documents by keyword, US and Europe, quarterly 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Supply chain decoupling Reshoring Nearshoring Source: AlphaSense, Deutsche Bank Length of each post-war US economic cycle by date the cycle ended (months) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 2020 2001 1970 1991 1945 2009 1980 1965 1968 1949 1975 1961 1982 Financial crisis to covid 1990s boom to tech bubble 1980s boom to 1990s recession Tech burst to financial crisis Source: Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank The weaponisation of trade - Luke Templeman Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 7 Amid the deglobalisation trend, two ecosystems will likely start to develop within semiconductors in 2023. One centred around the US, the other around China. The separation of powers was brewing before the war in Ukraine, but the conflict has likely intensified it. If two chip ecosystems do indeed develop, China could become more important for non-US chip companies in the long-term. The recent US ban on American companies' exports of software and equipment for advanced computing chips represents a shift from 'outpacing Chinese technological advances' to 'targeting a decoupling of the semiconductor supply chain'. The US rule has also thrown upside down the supply chains of semiconductors. Until now, the industry was well-integrated within a highly specialised global system. Each region was responsible for different stages of the production process as it made use of its comparative advantage. This scenario only works well, however, when there is free trade and positive geopolitical relations. Because there are more than 50 points across the value chain where one region holds more than 65 per cent of the global market share, a failure in any can lead to disruption in the entire industry. One particular point in the global supply chain which will likely feel the ripple effect from the US rule is Taiwan. The island dominates the production of advanced semiconductors. Apart from the risk caused by export bans, the island is vulnerable to geopolitical disputes and possible natural disasters. The global importance of TSMC, Taiwan's large semiconductor company, is highlighted in the fact that it has the capacity to manufacture 54 per cent of the world's semiconductors and 90 per cent of the most advanced chips. Regardless of its global importance, its physical presence is local. Nearly all of its long-term assets, including its manufacturing facilities, are in Taiwan. Taiwan continues to rely on strategic partnerships with the West - the US is its critical international supporter. Meanwhile, China is its largest export market. Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August added pressure to the semiconductor industry. Any future restrictions could squeeze access to inputs necessary for production and end markets. To be sure, it is in the interest of neither China nor the US to damage Taiwanese chipmaking capacity or cut off market access as Taiwan's role is not easy to replace. Achieving tech parity with Taiwan would likely take years, whilst the same cost efficiency is a long way away. Aside from geopolitical tensions, the world's hub for semiconductors is situated in one of the most tectonically complex regions in the world. To address that, TSMC facilities are built with seismic activity in mind. Yet, if a major earthquake were to cause significant damage to Taiwan's chipmaking capacity, the rebuild could take years. In the case that Taiwan goes offline, everything from 5G networks, to the development of the 'metaverse', to the availability of dishwashers will be impacted. Share of global revenue in 2020 of finished semiconductor products 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 47% 18% 15% 8% 8% 4% United States South Korea Taiwan Japan EU China Source: IC insights, Deutsche Bank Market share, semiconductor manufacturers TSMC 54% 16% 6% 7% 17% SMC Others Samsung United Microelectronics Corporation Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank Semiconductors in 2023: a not so 'semi' decoupling - Marion Laboure, Cassidy Ainsworth-Grace Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 8 The new macro regime has yanked the 'growth' label away from technology stocks. Yet reports of their deaths are greatly exaggerated. In fact, many technology companies generate considerable cash and may move towards being considered 'value' investments. Inevitably, something will rise and take their place as a 'growth' stocks. But instead of belonging to a specific sector, such companies will need to have a set of characteristics that align with the new macro backdrop. It is not just rising rates that may shift tech stocks from growth to value, or perhaps 'quality' investments. Tech faces a progressively more hostile environment. Inflation and slower economic growth are, of course, key macro headwinds. On top of that, tech companies face the risk of increased influence from anti-trust and competition policies. That likely means lower valuation multiples. Shareholders are more demanding too - in this year of rising rates, payouts and cost discipline have been prioritised over last decade's "growth at all costs" paradigm. As many technology companies mature after double-digit growth, attention thus shifts to how much capital they can return. So, what are the new growth leaders? The answer is not a single sector, but a number of features that can be found across industries. They revolve around the ability to capitalise on structural shifts in the economy and the need to increase productivity. One such trait is the ability to do well in a world with multiple geopolitical powers and tensions. Themes such as reshoring may favour firms that can scale up near their home markets and absorb the costs associated with that. Fracturing global supply chains is a related trend companies can capitalise on. A second growth area relates to being involved in the green transition, particularly renewables and materials, as countries adjust their infrastructure and energy systems. Firms involved in efficiency-improving technologies that boost productivity can surpass consumer-focussed tech that dominated much of the past decade but relied heavily on low rates and greater global integration. Interestingly, corporates will find that one does not need to be a tech firm to benefit from tech innovation, as long as you have the cash. Contracting tech multiples can help with that. At a sectoral level, industrial policy will give a structural boost to companies involved in clean tech, healthcare, computing and cybersecurity. This comes with a caveat. Unlike the growth stocks of last decade, the new growth firms will have to generate positive cash flows, not burn cash. They will need it to finance R&D themselves and acquire new capabilities. That trait will be company-specific. The luxury of reinvesting cash flows will be accessible only to companies with compelling growth stories driven by fundamentals. Without the tidal wave of the Faangs, the technology sector may no longer be the leading driver of stock market returns it was last decade. Despite that, these companies will continue to matter due to their relative size and ability to generate cash. Still, the retreat from tech can limit market-wide gains and redefine how investors see growth stocks. That will leave a gap for the new growth stocks to emerge. A way to go to reprice 'old' growth 15 30 45 60 Aggregates for S&P 500 by sector P/E 5Yr Avg LF Current P/E P/E end of '21 Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank Tech has not always dominated 'growth' stocks 0% 20% 40% 60% 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Share of members by sector S&P 500 pure growth index IT & Communications Industrials, energy and materials Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank If Tech is the new value, what is the new growth? - Galina Pozdnyakova Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 9 Amongst the breakdowns in tried and true portfolio heuristics this year, none has stood out quite so much as the spectacular drop in the 60/40 portfolio. Indeed, many investors now wonder if the once-normal negative correlation between equities and bonds will ever return. That adds to concerns over several other market correlations that have not worked out as many investors expected, such as gold and inflation. What investors miss in the correlation debate will become more apparent in 2023 - the correlation between stocks and bonds may matter less to the 60/40 portfolio than asset classes' volatility contribution amid a more uncertain macro regime. The market drops this year mainly highlight the fact that while the market weights of equities and bonds are split as 60/40, the risk exposure within the portfolio is much more highly weighted towards equities - often close to 90 per cent. This mismatch is why the drop in 60/40 portfolios and their high volatility this year more closely resembled that of the broader equity market, although bonds also heavily sold off (see chart on the left). As the chart on the right shows, although the correlation between equities and bonds became positive this year, the magnitude of comovement (beta) is still low relative to other assets. As investors rebuild their 60/40 portfolios in 2023, risk management will therefore be front of mind as the return of beneficial cross-asset correlations can be hard to predict. First and foremost, this will involve better diversification of equity risk. The point here is to reduce the portfolio's equity market beta for a world of lower growth, higher inflation and more frequent left tail events that lead to the type of turbulent cross-asset repricing experienced in 2022. Assuming US large-cap technology stocks no longer outperform as they once did, equity returns will become more meagre and potentially revert to long-term averages. That means that the nearly 90 per cent of equity risk in the classic 60/40 portfolio may extend its drag on performance, especially relative to the heavily repriced fixed income markets. The 60/40 portfolio will therefore need to include more lowly correlated and less volatile assets - in other words, those with a low equity beta. In 2023, less correlated stocks and bonds will be found in new places. Consider the themes that have accelerated this year, such as waning globalisation, geopolitical jitters, and diverging monetary policy cycles. These are all decoupling international assets and thus will favour geographic diversification. For those who construct portfolios, ensuring the risk exposure of 60/40 portfolios is closer to 60/40 than 90/10 requires placing volatilities at the forefront of portfolio construction. This will keep bonds firmly as the backbone of a portfolio and emphasise the value of active duration management as central banks fight inflation. For equities, this will imply a move from growth to quality stocks and a shift to coupon clipping in credit from high-yielding stocks. And finally, it will raise further questions about whether 60/40 portfolios should be increasingly allocated to private capital. Cross-asset volatility fuelled 60/40 underperformance (YTD return of 60/40 US portfolios) -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 10 14 18 22 S&P 500 x 60% Treasuries x 40% Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank Higher correlations can be countered by lower volatility -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 Equity beta '10-'21 Equity beta '22 Russell 2000 US REITs World ex US EM US HY US IG Commodities Treasuries Beta with S&P 500 Size of the circle represents correlation Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank The new 60/40: risk exposure trumps correlations - Galina Pozdnyakova Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 10 The housing market in 2023 will likely bifurcate between the US and the rest of the world. Although house price drops appear inevitable everywhere, the stronger structure of the US housing market could add to its broader economic advantages - namely energy self-sufficiency and a (relatively) resilient economy. Even though some weak spots have developed in the US this year, the property market there remains strong. Yes, with the Fed funds rate aimed at restraining the post-pandemic rush in inflation, US lenders have responded by more than doubling the rate on a 30-year mortgage to a two-decade high of seven per cent. However, after the last crisis, mortgage lending standards were tightened, so called NINJA loans (No Income, No Job, No Assets) were shunned, and adjustable-rate mortgages became the exception rather than the rule. Efforts to prevent another property collapse have culminated in the US mortgage loan-to-value ratio halving to a little more than 25 per cent. Moreover, the rise in house prices has so far outpaced the modest rise in debt. As a sign of security, government-sponsored Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to act as a backstop, buying mortgages from lenders to hold or repackage, and guaranteeing timely payment of principal and interest. The health of the US housing balance sheet gives it some resilience as the broader market cools. Indeed, mortgage applications are a little more than half of what they were a year ago. Affordability has also decreased. A homebuyer with a 20 per cent down payment, that can afford to spend $2,500 a month on their mortgage, can now afford a home worth around $450,000. A year ago, the same person would have bought a home worth $700,000. One group has reasons to stay calm - existing mortgage holders with years of tolerable fixed rates ahead of them. While the rebuilt system in the US is helping in this downturn, other countries appear riskier. Indicators such as housing permits and housing starts are flashing amber across key economies, not just the US. What differentiates the US from the rest of the world is the fact that other countries appear less ready to withstand a property shock. Scandinavian, Dutch and Australian households have a debt-to-disposable income ratio of 200 per cent or more, twice as much as in the US. With this in mind, between 40-50 per cent of Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish and Canadian households have mortgages. Perhaps more alarming is that the vast majority of Finnish and Norwegian mortgages are fixed for no more than a year. In most developed countries, non-prime buyers have moved in with their parents for longer, stayed in rentals, or borrowed from less-regulated shadow institutions with punitive rates. The consequences of these structural shifts go beyond the typical belt-tightening that accompanies a fall in house-prices. For most high-inflation countries, those consequences could amplify the expected recessions of 2023. That is a deep concern considering they do not have the same economic buffers that the US currently enjoys. A bifurcation in property market: US v Rest of the world - Adrian Cox US Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio % 10 20 30 40 50 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10 '15 '20 The ratio has halved since the GFC peak back to 1980s levels Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank Total household debt as % of net disposable income, 2021 or latest available year 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Source: OECD, Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 11 Food security shot into the spotlight this year following the risk of shortages from Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, it commanded its own agenda at the recent COP meeting. As a result, 2023 is shaping up as an acceleration year for the commercialisation of 'precision agriculture'. Precision agriculture is the concept of tailoring farming processes to specific parcels of land by using the proliferation of wireless connectivity, new hardware, and analysis tools. These include positioning systems like GPS, geo-mapping, sensors, integrated electronic communications and variable rate technology. The aim is to help solve the food problem, particularly in emerging markets, by increasing productivity and crop yields. Precision farming tech can roughly be separated into three categories: guiding, recording and reacting. The former includes forms of automatic steering for tractors and self-propelled agricultural machinery, such as driver assistance and controlled traffic farming. Recording tech helps with soil and soil moisture mapping, as well as canopy and yield mapping. Reacting tech means variable-rate irrigation, application technologies for nutrients and crop protecting agents, as well as precision seeding and weeding. 1 Take, for example, variable rate technology. One study has shown an increase of 8 per cent in wheat yields (for 10 per cent less nitrogen), a rise of nearly 7 per cent in yields over 4 years in winter wheat (through variable-rate seeding) and 7 per cent growth in net income on fields that used variable rate seeding and data-influenced management zones. 2 The point of precision farming is to produce more food from specific parcels of land using fewer resources. Indeed, one Spanish example showed a 25 per cent water savings 3 . Of course, the economic benefits are different across regions. In the US, as a share of total production, precision agriculture's potential gross economic benefit is of 18 per cent. 4 As precision farming techniques become more widespread, they will help decarbonise the food chain. This is critical in countries achieving their self-stated climate goals as greenhouse gas emissions from farm, livestock, and related land use comprise up to 25 per cent of all emissions from human activities. 5 The food system as a whole is responsible for a larger share. Carbon offsets will likely be a driving force behind the decarbonisation efforts as they help solve the issue of lack of financial incentives from agriculture climate adaptation. With carbon credits taking centre stage at COP27 following the US carbon offset plan, their path towards a projected $190bn market by 2030 (up from $2bn in 2021 ) will likely take a big step forward in 2023 with the help of precision agriculture techniques. It is rare that a true win-win scenario like this is offered to investors. 2023 could be the year they take it. Precision agriculture: a precise solution to food security - Olga Cotaga 1 Soto Embodas et.al., "The contribution of precision agriculture technologies to farm productivity and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU", 2019 2 Business Wales of Welsh Government, "Can Precision Farming Help Mitigate Climate Change?" 3 European Parliament, "Precision agriculture: an opportunity for EU farmers - potential support with the cap 2014-2020" 4 USDA, "A case for rural broadband: Insights on rural broadband infrastructure and next generation precision agriculture technologies", April 2019 5 FAO 8 November 2021 Global VC, PE investment in AgTech* 0 20 40 60 80 0 500 1,000 1,500 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Total value of VC/PE investments Total number of investment rounds $m *Descriptions include Agriculture Tech, Agriculture Technology, Precision Farming and Precision Agriculture Source: Factset, Deutsche Bank Percentage of US farms with internet access 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 Source: USDA, Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 12 "Give me your data"- cyberattacks, the bigger new bully in 2023 - Cassidy Ainsworth-Grace The events of 2022 threw into sharp relief the two questions that may shape how corporate digital infrastructure needs to change in 2023. First, who is to blame for cyberattacks: corporates or hackers? Second, what will tougher cyber regulation mean for corporate responsibility? Some distressing hacks in 2022 (example below) showed that cyberattacks can no longer be written off as simply the cost of doing business. Indeed, the public is beginning to see corporates as being at fault. This change in the mood follows a pivotal year for cybercrime. In 2021, cyberattacks increased 31 per cent compared with 2020. 1 And the losses are deepening. A third of central banks in developed economies have indicated cybersecurity losses have increased by over 20 per cent since the pandemic. 2 Ransomware has emerged as one of the most popular technological threats. This involves infiltrating a victim's network to encrypt files and hold them for ransom. The number of these incidents in the US more than doubled in 2021. 3 Globally, the number of ransomware attackers grew 151 per cent. An example from Australia this year shows what may be in store in larger economies. The event was a hack of Australian health insurance provider Medibank. The result was the theft and ransom of the personal information from nearly a third of the population. Medibank did not pay the ransom, and the hackers not only kept the data encrypted, but also published sensitive medical details on dark web forums. Compensation discussions are ongoing but the bigger picture is that this attack is emblematic of the growth in large scale attacks of such personal information. Given the current mood regarding corporates in the US and Europe, if growth here continues, it will quickly spark a heavy political response with serious ramifications for companies in question. The impact of politics on cybersecurity took a notable step forward this year. In March, the Biden administration mandated companies to report hacks within 72 hours of discovery, and within 24 hours if a ransom is involved. With the US as a starting point, it is likely that similar regulation will permeate across advanced economies. Companies are still underestimating this, but if the growth rate in hacks continues in 2023 it is only a matter of time before an influential country has to respond to a Medibank-style hack. The concerning thing for companies is that the risk has grown with work-from-home arrangements. Identity management and data protection have particularly suffered and hackers have moved their focus away from the core network to end users. Better regulation to incentivise better security is therefore critical. 1 World Economic Forum 2 Bank for International Settlements 3 US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Number and cost of ransomware incidents filed with the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 0 300 600 900 1,200 1,500 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 To t al am o u n t i n U S D ( m i l l i o n s ) N u m b e r o f i n i d e n t s Number of ransomware-related incidents (lhs) Total cumulative cost of all ransomware-related incidents fi led in 2021 (rhs, USD millions) Source: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 13 Pessimism is seductive, and especially so when we look ahead to 2023. The yield curve is hideously inverted, recession is coming, and stock markets usually bottom only after a recession has started. But when the outlook is overwhelmingly negative, and no one is positioned for good news, markets can bounce on any unexpected positives that do arise. And given there are several scenarios where good news on big events could occur in 2023, that makes for the unappetising decision for investors. Should they chase what may be another bear market rally? Or will any positive boost finally be the real deal? First consider inflation. In the US this will likely only fall to 4.0 per cent by next December. But just as many investors could not believe the searing growth of the US money supply in 2020 would lead to today's level of inflation, many find it hard to conceive that the record pace at which the money supply is currently shrinking will impact the other way. Second, China. The country's financial markets and real economy have suffered from covid restrictions this year. However, with inflation forecast to stay below three per cent next year, China can afford to further stimulate its economy. There is upside risk if they do. Third, the war in Ukraine. It is impossible to predict how this situation will further unfold. And, true, there may only be a small chance that good news will emerge. However, given the overwhelming consensus for a drawn-out conflict, any progress towards a resolution would certainly give global economies and markets a sudden boost. As investors try to predict the price response to any good news, they may have to contend with a market that moves more rapidly than expected. There are a few reasons for this. One concerns the very low positioning in risk assets which means large investors chasing rallies can cause markets to 'crash upwards'. A second reason comes from the simple maths of interest rates (and expectations) moving from very-low levels. When a company's WACC moves from, say, 5 to 10 per cent (as may have recently occurred for some corporates), there is far more value lost than if the WACC moves the same amount but from 10 to 15 per cent. For technical buffs, 2022 offers further clues that markets move rapidly on good news. Despite the selloff in 2022, the S&P 500 has posted 22 days where it jumped over 2.0 per cent. That is not only the fourth most of any year since the Great Depression, but it is also comfortably the most in any year with a relatively "small" market drawdown. So, amidst the (justifiably) pessimistic forecasts for 2023, it appears investors are jittery to be involved in any upside. Blame algorithmic trading, passive ETFs, or even FOMO. Whatever the cause, when markets do eventually jump, the speed of the moves may catch investors by surprise. When to price in good news - Luke Templeman 3m change in M2 money supply - US -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 Quickest decline in M2 in at least 40 years 16% Source: Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 14 Appendix 1 Important Disclosures *Other Information Available upon Request Prices are current as of the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated and are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors . 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